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Crime as Social Reality 
By JEROME HALL 
E VERYBODY talks about "crime" 
and "criminals"; and their mean- 
ing. The answers are assumed to exist; 
they are assumed to be common prop- 
erty. Actually, the obvious conceals the 
most difficult of problems. The simple 
questions, on second thought, become the 
most provocative ones, even though they 
are not in the least impertinent. 
MEANING OF "CRIME" 
The most obvious fact about "crime" 
is that the term is employed in many dif- 
ferent senses. The basic difficulties con- 
cern the meaning of "crime." Many 
words in everyday discourse are to some 
extent and in some contexts, ambiguous. 
This is especially true of words having 
to do with social affairs, human relation- 
ships, where what is most significant 
meets neither eye nor ear. But "crime" 
and "criminal" are loaded with even 
greater burdens than are most of these 
terms. Here one quickly recognizes that 
communication of ideas is not the only 
function of language; for, plainly, "crimi- 
nal" is a term that is much more than 
description. It is also a word of re- 
proach, of condemnation, of obloquy, of 
stimulation to action and to repression. 
In recent months "criminal" has en- 
tered the common vocabulary of inter- 
national propaganda; the leaders of the 
warring countries call each other "crimi- 
nal." The speaker wishes to arouse emo- 
tion, to move his audience in a desired 
direction. It has become abundantly 
evident that "criminal" is a tag to be 
placed on political enemies-not merely 
or even especially on those who injure 
person or property. Much too fre- 
quently it has been an instrument to 
mask the torture of great benefactors 
of mankind. In a number of countries 
we find new criminal codes expressed in 
the broadest possible terms constructed 
on a sweeping axiom of "social defense." 
"Criminal behavior" is, accordingly, any 
"antisocial" conduct, and in actual ad- 
ministration, "antisocial" becomes any 
conduct that runs counter to the politics 
of the regime. The meaning of "crimi- 
nal" is thus determined by authority, 
i.e., by force. Some of our criminolo- 
gists are beginning to wake up to the 
fact that there are political and ethical 
problems involved in "crime" that the 
term is sometimes chiefly an index of 
who has power to wield the maximum 
force. In addition, we are familiar with 
equally loose usages in everyday talk, 
where the speaker means to say that cer- 
tain persons or behaviors are unethical, 
unprincipled, degenerate, or even stupid. 
It might be imagined that within the 
confines of the law there would be few 
such troublesome questions. But unless 
one is content to run in a circle, it is 
plain that even here the accepted defini- 
tion of "crime" is only superficially pre- 
cise. This may be seen by reference to 
the perennial issue of the differences be- 
tween "crime" and "tort." A crime is 
a violation of a penal law, it is said, while 
torts are proscribed by civil or private 
law. Yet so great a scholar as Austin 
contended that there were no substantial 
differences between the two, perhaps 
least of all on the basis of the degree or 
importance of the public interest. Nor 
is it easy to demonstrate that punish- 
ment characterizes the one, compensa- 
tion the other. Punitive damages and 
penal actions are only the most salient of 
the difficulties in the way of this thesis. 
The law has been largely directed by 
procedure in its early history, and by 
the purposes of litigants and their law- 
yers; perhaps only by the suggested 
functional differences can the two be 
1 
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2 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 
distinguished. Even within the more re- 
stricted field that is invariably labeled 
"criminal," the same difficulty persists. 
It is seen, notably, in the distinctions 
drawn between crimes mala in se and 
those mala prohibita, or, as a recent 
writer would have it, between the real 
crimes and the public torts. 
Thus it is apparent that even when 
limited to law, "crime" has such varied 
denotation as to suggest that the wisest 
course may turn out to be elimination 
of the word entirely from scientific dis- 
course, and substitution of numerous 
specific terms. In any event, if we think 
that beyond emotive, prerogative, and 
loose uses of the word there are facts 
denoted by the term "crime" which can 
be clearly described and understood, and 
that, proceeding thus, we can discover 
better answers to the relevant distressing 
social problems than any now known, 
our first bit of sophistication is to be on 
guard against this insidious ambiguity of 
everyday speech. 
Nonetheless, any significant critique 
of crime must inevitably be oriented in 
the existing "recognized" discussions of 
it. If we analyze such discourse, we may 
be able to discover the principal issues 
and the difficulties in the way of greater 
understanding. If we work our way 
through the existing field as carefully 
and intuitively as possible, at the same 
time nourishing awareness of besetting 
linguistic quicksands as well as of our 
own predilections, what do we find? 
EMOTION AND ANALYSIS 
About as certain an observation as 
any is that emotion has something to 
do with crime itself-not merely talking 
about it. Public feeling is common when 
there is public knowledge of major 
harms; the deeply rooted affective states 
are revealed in newspapers, in the court- 
room, sometimes in violent, overt at- 
tacks. The criminal law may be viewed 
as the rationalization of such states, 
though it is much more than that. One 
has only to scrutinize "scholarly" dis- 
cussions to discover here too, alas, fre- 
quent biases in what purport to be 
rigorously objective analyses of the phe- 
nomena. 
The need to emphasize this second 
pervading difficulty should be obvious 
to any thoughtful observer who con- 
sciously, at least, serves no other end 
than discovery of truth in this most diffi- 
cult of all fields of exploration. Some- 
times these drives are sublimated into 
desire for reform, in itself surely not 
unworthy, yet all too frequently cloud- 
ing the scholar's mind, rendering fruit- 
ful debate impossible. Social policy is 
as important as social science; but unless 
preferences and evaluations are distin- 
guished from knowledge and understand- 
ing, there is little reason to expect 
marked progress in any social science, 
and least, perhaps, in criminology. 
The current Sociology of Knowledge 
raises interesting problems in this re- 
gard; such analysis of ideologies is apt 
to be circumspect. As to discussions of 
crime, we have long been victims of 
scholastic oversimplifications, even of 
fads that, in abortive efforts to surmount 
the real difficulties, limited the range of 
investigation to muscular movements, 
with talk and thought either ignored or 
labeled "oral behavior," as though that 
aided understanding. 
Next to such narrowing of the phe- 
nomena together with the limiting axi- 
oms of mechanics implied thereby to be 
the sole source of explanation, under- 
standing has been further restricted by 
other dogmas, notably by rather per- 
verse theories of human nature. With 
human beings, especially primitives, re- 
garded as wholly irrational and as in- 
exorably fixed in the course of their 
conduct, any discipline constructed on 
corresponding premises would hardly en- 
lighten. Persistent effort is required to 
limit ambiguity and emotion and the 
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appeal of mechanistic and particularistic 
rationalizations. Only by maximum ef- 
forts to slough off the artificial garb of 
fashionable vocabulary, only by stead- 
fast efforts to rise above the Schools, 
may we hope to talk sense about the 
major problems of social disorganization. 
ACTIONS, TALK, AND THEORY 
The above remarks indicate that we 
need to distinguish what "the common 
man" does and says about crime from 
what scholars say about crime. Viewed 
in broadest outline, the first enterprise, 
if assiduously prosecuted, would be a 
sort of chronicle, a history of conflicts 
and disputes, the pains and injuries hu- 
man beings have inflicted on one an- 
other in connection therewith, and what 
reasons they gave to explain their con- 
duct. This would include the actions 
and talk of "offenders" (from society's 
viewpoint; "oppressed" from their own), 
as well as those of pater, chieftain, offi- 
cial ("oppressor" or "tyrant" from the 
"offender's" point of view). The second 
sort of enterprise would constitute analy- 
sis of the discussions of scholars, of theo- 
ries of the above noted phenomena. 
Although this dichotomy should be 
useful analytically, it is apparent that 
the two realms intermingle: in the very 
selection by the scholar of "significant" 
phenomena, are premised theories and 
values, shared with the community it- 
self. But scholars are conscious of 
their value-judgments. The suggested 
approach centers initially on observable 
phenomena. We can see individuals 
inflicting physical injuries on one an- 
other, we can see the conduct desig- 
nated "assaults," "trespasses to prop- 
erty," "homicide," and so forth. In 
addition to the participants in these 
doings, there is the behavior of third 
persons, including group behavior or 
that of its representatives, namely, the 
"banishments," "executions," "imprison- 
ments," and such. One central problem 
is: Why do these outsiders interfere? 
Once this question is asked, we have 
left the sphere of behavior alone, and 
think in terms of culture and motivation. 
Indeed, no one has seriously tried to ex- 
plain such phenomena solely by refer- 
ence to observable behavior; the very 
inclusion of group behavior, at least 
when that extends beyond the immediate 
family, implies some theory of signifi- 
cance not entirely dependent on be- 
havior. Here, then, it is essential to 
take account of the talk that accom- 
panies the behavior. It represents vari- 
ous levels of significance. The parties 
themselves base their conduct on various 
rationalizations, understanding of which 
requires reference to nonphysical or 
metaphysical entities. A man has failed 
to bring a sacrifice to the gods, he has 
performed an act taboo, he has ridi- 
culed his mother-in-law-the very recital 
points to ideas that are much more po- 
tent in their effect on conduct than 
many physical forces. In their talk 
about the unpleasant conduct of their 
fellows, simple people are concrete. 
What the "wise" man says will depend 
on whether he is an official intent on 
enforcement, or a mere onlooker-a 
scholar perhaps. In these latter in- 
stances, there is apt to be generalization 
about laws, norms, customs, mores, pro- 
tection of society, and the like. 
We here and now confront so much of 
the above phenomena as is known to us, 
and our job is to reach a fuller under- 
standing of it all-the doings, the com- 
mon talk, the official pronouncements, 
and the analyses of scholars. Is it pos- 
sible to take a fresh approach to the en- 
tire problem, one that promises results? 
Recent exploration for some core of 
meaning of "crime" has resulted in such 
general notions as "disapproval," "viola- 
tion of group values," and "injury to 
public interests," as common denomina- 
tors. But the besetting evil here is that 
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the generality of these ideas sharply 
diminishes both their significance as 
symbols and their utility as instruments 
of discovery. 
RELATIVITY OF CRIME 
Coupled with the above insights is the 
prevalent hypothesis that crime is rela- 
tive to time and place. This apparently 
means that the behavior punished (and, 
presumably, the values, disapprobation, 
and so forth) varies from place to place 
and from time to time. The supporting 
instances are familiar--polygamy is 
criminal in the United States, it is even 
approved in other countries; so, also, 
as to patricide among primitives, and 
prohibition of alcoholic beverages with 
us. 
It is common in such discussion to 
concede that three or four crimes, usu- 
ally, treason, murder, incest, and theft, 
are universal. The problem raises nu- 
merous difficulties. The minor ones can 
be summarily dismissed. Thus, one 
would not expect forgery to be criminal 
in a preliterate society, nor speeding on 
the Sahara or, indeed, in New York 
prior to 1900, nor flying a plane 300 
feet above a city prior to 1910. Such 
immediate dependence of criminal be- 
havior on culture and technology is too 
evident to give rise to speculation. The 
problem concerning the relationships be- 
tween socioeconomic conditions and 
criminal behavior arises at the point 
where we pass from specific instances of 
criminal behavior to types of criminal 
behavior. Not only must these cate- 
gories be broad (e.g., crimes against 
property without violence), but the 
socioeconomic conditions must be gen- 
eralized to the extent that apt analogies 
can be found in societies representing 
different cultures. 
If, with this objective in view, we try 
to uncover the facts "just as they ac- 
tually occurred," we find a mass of 
contradictory evidence that makes likely 
generalization presently very difficult, if 
not impossible. Thus, many writers 
assert that theft (as understood by us) 
is universally criminal. But a trust- 
worthy observer who spent many years 
in India reports that "almost every In- 
dian domestic pilfers . . . during his long 
experience of the country he has rarely 
met exceptions. This form of brigand- 
age is ingrained in their natures." 
The deficiencies in existing studies re- 
garding even this central problem, be- 
havior universally held criminal, are 
apparent on examination of the chief 
authority on this subject, Westermarck's 
Origin and Development of the Moral 
Ideas. The ultimate testing ground is, 
plainly, homicide; it is highly significant 
that even here there is the greatest con- 
fusion, at least on the surface of the 
data. Thus Westermarck reports: 
Among various uncivilized peoples, how- 
ever, human life is said to be held very 
cheap. "The Australian Dieyerie, we are 
told, would for a mere trifle kill their dear- 
est friend. In Fiji there is an 'utter dis- 
regard of the value of human life.' . . . 
Some of the Himalayan mountaineers are 
reported to put men to death merely for 
the satisfaction of seeing the blood flow 
and of marking the last struggles of the 
victim." 2 
But just prior to his quoting a mass of 
contradictory data, he states: "I ven- 
ture to believe that this [respect for our 
fellow creatures' lives] holds good not 
only among civilized nations, but among 
the lower races as well; . . ." S Then 
after statements of observers apparently 
to the contrary, he concludes: "We may 
without hesitation accept Professor Ty- 
lor's statement that 'no known tribe, 
however low and ferocious, has ever 
1 H. J. A. Hervey, Cameos of Indian Crime, 
London, 1929. 
2 As quoted in Edward Westermarck, The 
Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas 
(London: Macmillan, 1906), Vol. I, pp. 328- 
29. 
SIbid., p. 328. 
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admitted that men may kill one another 
indiscriminately.' "4 
TOWARD SCIENTIFIC GENERALIZATION 
But what is "indiscriminate"? We 
must remember that all civilized societies 
condone, justify, and even approve cer- 
tain homicides, quite in addition to war. 
Consider our own law. In at least two 
American states, a husband may kill his 
spouse or her paramour in the act of 
adultery. Among certain people where, 
we are told, hospitality requires a host 
to place his wife at the disposal of a 
guest, this rule of law might seem odd, 
indeed. So, too, as to Holmes's decision 
that a man may stand his ground if 
attacked and kill his assailant despite 
the fact that a safe avenue of retreat is 
available. And what of the blanket rule 
that permits a police officer to slay a 
suspected felon to effect arrest, especially 
when viewed in light of the arbitrary 
classification of offenses? 
Perhaps we may hazard the view that 
while some of these (to us) justifiable 
homicides may seem as unjustifiable to 
so-called primitive peoples as many of 
their killings are to us, yet there is a 
common ground. But thus far its state- 
ment has taken the form of such dubious 
generalization as that the "irreducible 
conditions of survival" (or of "civiliza- 
tion") must be preserved. 
Consider, next, the usual appraisals 
of primitive patricide. The clear impli- 
cation is that the writer is talking about 
the same behavior that constitutes homi- 
cide in our society, and that what is most 
seriously condemned by our laws, mores, 
and ethics, is not only permitted but 
approved and sometimes even required 
in those societies. 
The patent fallacy here is to compare 
expurgated actual primitive practices 
with the book-law of advanced societies. 
What must be compared, instead, are 
unwritten primitive legal norms with our 
written laws, the entire relevant fact- 
situations and behavior in both societies, 
and the accompanying talk, rationaliza- 
tions, pronouncements, and analyses. 
We should probably find that the primi- 
tives who commit what our observers 
call "patricide" also respect their parents 
and share our ethical principles con- 
cerning treatment of them. On the 
other hand, it would be necessary to 
consider euthanasia in our society, and 
numerous instances of acquittal and par- 
don in cases of homicide of blood rela- 
tions where relief from acute suffering is 
the motive. Thus, we, too, if judged by 
our actual practices, indulge in invalidi- 
cide even where the behavior corresponds 
to the legal definition of patricide. The 
like is true of infanticide, typically rec- 
ognized in administration of the law as 
disclosing considerable grounds for ex- 
treme mitigation of the penalty, which 
has recently secured official recognition 
in the English statute on the subject.5 
The surest single generalization im- 
mediately available is that all societies 
proscribe behavior that runs counter to 
their preservation. Group preservation 
requires not only prohibition of indis- 
criminate killings and of the lesser bat- 
teries and mayhems that lead directly 
to such homicide; it also requires pro- 
tection of infants, and consequently of 
institutions that provide, as well, for 
care of females during the childbearing 
period and for some time afterwards. 
Thus the generalization that "crime" is 
"relative" does not aid understanding; 
it merely points to the variation of crimi- 
nal behavior and implies a total failure 
to recognize any common characteristics. 
4As quoted in Edward Westermarck, The 
Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas 
(London: Macmillan, 1906), Vol. I, p. 331. 
5 Cf. " But there can be little doubt that 
the wholesale infanticide of many of the lower 
races is in the main due to the hardships of 
savage life." Westermarck, op. cit., p. 399. 
"The exposure of deformed or sickly infants 
was undoubtedly an ancient custom in Greece; 
." Ibid., p. 408. 
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Yet these are the sine qua non of any 
science. 
SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
As a matter of fact, we have already 
advanced our understanding of crime 
much beyond the indications of asser- 
tions as to its "relativity"; for we know 
a great deal about the relation of crimi- 
nal behavior to social and economic con- 
ditions and also to technology. Espe- 
cially is this true as regards crimes 
against property as they developed in 
England. This development has been 
analyzed with special reference to the 
Commercial Revolution that began in 
the fifteenth century, and, with greater 
detail, with reference to the Industrial 
Revolution." We know that from a 
single norm, "larceny" (patterned proba- 
bly on medieval cattle-lifting), which 
originally designated simply direct, 
physical taking of chattels from an- 
other's possession, there evolved several 
different norms as social and economic 
changes raised new needs. The new 
norms denoted certain behaviors; as the 
former came into existence, the latter 
became crimes. 
With the beginning of modern busi- 
ness in the latter part of the fifteenth 
century, came employment of carriers to 
deliver merchandise to distant points. 
To these carriers the merchandise was 
voluntarily handed over by the shippers; 
hence, subsequent conversion would not 
violate the law against stealing as then 
defined. The process by which the 
judges extended "larceny" to include 
"breaking bulk" by a lawful possessor, 
retaining but redefining the old words, 
is important with regard to the role of 
political agencies in the creation of crimi- 
nal behavior. The origin of the new 
offense is important, also, in relation to 
changed economic conditions. The new 
law designating certain behavior "crimi- 
nal" constituted an attempt to meet 
needs and demands arising from new 
social problems. 
The Commercial Revolution brought 
mobility of population to a relatively 
static society. Servants, previously an- 
chored to estates, increasingly picked up 
and absconded with their masters' valua- 
bles. These chattels were in the serv- 
ants' possession; hence, as in the car- 
riers' case, conversion did not constitute 
larceny. But since the servant was usu- 
ally about the master's premises, it was 
possible to designate the former's physi- 
cal control of the property as mere "cus- 
tody" and thus to place all-important 
"possession" in the master, hence allow- 
ing a trespass to another's possession and 
"larceny"-still the same old bottle, but 
containing new substance thereafter. 
Again a new crime and new criminals 
were created; not arbitrarily, be it noted, 
but upon rational grounds, to meet felt 
needs and new attitudes regarding con- 
duct previously tolerated, but now defi- 
nitely antisocial under the changed con- 
ditions. 
"Larceny" was a much broader ave- 
nue for adaptation to new conditions 
than can be briefly indicated. Suffice it 
to add that in 1780, some few years 
prior to the rise of the law of fraud, the 
ancient category gave birth to the new 
offense of "larceny by trick," where 
possession but not ownership was vol- 
untarily transferred in reliance upon 
fraudulent representations of fact. 
The law of criminal fraud is replete 
with significance for the intimate inter- 
play of legal norms, public attitudes, and 
changing social and economic conditions. 
The enormous losses in stock speculation 
as the bubbles burst developed aware- 
ness of the potency of "mere" misrepre- 
sentation of fact to wreak damage on a 
large scale. Yet as late as 1761, in a 
case where the defendant had misrepre- 
sented the quantity of merchandise sold, 
a high English court, which included 
I See the writer's Theft, Law and Society, 
1935. 
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Mansfield, found no criminal liability, 
declaring: "We are not to indict one 
man for making a fool of another." 
Less than thirty years later, criminal 
fraud was created. Continued stock 
losses, the disappearance of the guilds, 
large-scale merchandising, purchases 
from strangers at a distance, and the 
new credit economy are among the im- 
portant concomitant social and economic 
changes. New law resulted; new "crimi- 
nals" were designated for selection by 
the punitive apparatus of legal control. 
So far as certain individuals were con- 
cerned, it may have been sheer chance 
that one day made them regarded as 
respectable businessmen, and the next, 
as criminals. But in the large, the de- 
velopment was a rational adaptation to 
the interaction of many social forces 
operating to create new social problems. 
Today embezzlement is so common 
that it comes as a shock to learn that 
the crime did not exist in England until 
1799. There were earlier special and 
restricted types of embezzlement, con- 
fined, significantly enough, to the Bank 
of England, the South Sea Company, 
and the Post Office. But generally, prior 
to 1799 there were simply "breaches of 
trust"-not embezzlement; that is to 
say, those who prior to 1799 were merely 
untrustworthy, became after that date, 
criminals. 
LAWS RESULT FROM EXPERIENCE 
Again, it is well to note that these new 
laws and the consequent criminals which, 
in a somewhat odd sense, they may be 
said to have "produced" were not for- 
tuitous occurrences. Larceny by servant 
had long crystallized into behavior that 
was restricted to receipt of goods from 
the master. The economic revolutions, 
especially the rise of banks and other 
large business institutions, transformed 
employees' relations to the public into 
matters of paramount importance. Still 
it was not any rare imagination, any 
scientific prescience concerning future 
probabilities, that brought about the 
new laws. It was experience under new 
conditions and with many cases of large 
depredation by servants, accumulating 
more slowly than one imagines should 
have been necessary, that provided the 
driving force to change law to enlarge 
the area of criminal behavior. 
The above knowledge of theft, espe- 
cially as it developed in England, carries 
us an appreciable degree beyond mere 
recognition that "crimes are relative to 
time and place." But this knowledge 
needs to be supplemented by that of cor- 
responding developments in other coun- 
tries (e.g., adequate Russian data for 
the past twenty years) until we are able 
to generalize on the basis of specific com- 
parative data. As yet we have hardly 
begun to write the history of American 
crime and criminal law, but it is prob- 
able that many relationships between 
crime and social change similar to those 
described above could be discovered; 
obvious special points of attack in the 
American scene would be cattle-rustling, 
bootlegging, and racketeering. 
LAWS RESULT FROM BASIC IDEAS 
A similar history of crimes against the 
person would present much more difficult 
problems than did that of crimes against 
property. So far as this writer is aware, 
such a history has thus far evaded ade- 
quate presentation. The reasons are 
sufficiently apparent; the interests in- 
volved are elemental in the sefise of be- 
ing represented in all societies, however 
primitive. Accordingly, the underlying 
motives, values, and rationalizations are 
so deeply rooted in the history of the 
race as to defy easy exploration. In- 
stead of quantitative data and observ- 
able phenomena that accompany and 
symbolize economic change, one would 
need to deal with imponderables to a far 
greater extent. The configuration within 
which this division of criminal law and 
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crime must be set would need to be 
constructed very largely from more or 
less transcendental forms, from ideas and 
attitudes that are ingrained in human 
nature and ancient institutions. 
Equally difficult are crimes that spring 
directly from certain other ideas. For 
example, the criminal laws of the Ameri- 
can Colonies include such offenses as 
blasphemy, failure to attend church, dis- 
senting, idleness, being a Quaker, scold- 
ing, and by no means least in sig- 
nificance, witchcraft. How far does it 
advance our understanding of these of- 
fenses to know that they were "relative 
to the time and place"? And we have 
only to remember that Matthew Hale, 
one of the greatest scholars of modern 
times, presided at some of the major 
trials for witchcraft in England, to cau- 
tion against such facile generalizations 
about the Salem trials. Even Black- 
stone, writing in the latter part of the 
eighteenth century, credits the existence 
of witchcraft. It is apparent that under- 
standing such offenses is directly depend- 
ent, in part, on an adequate history of 
ideas. 
LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Similar problems are presented by the 
rules of law on responsibility for crimi- 
nal behavior, especially with reference 
to diseased minds. The accepted version 
has it that earliest liability was absolute, 
and that many centuries passed before 
modern ideas of culpability, resting on 
distinctions between such notions as 
negligence, intention, and accident, were 
accepted. But discovery has been slight 
and long retarded in the field of ancient 
legal history; hence we must recall 
Holmes's opposition to the above thesis, 
and his suggestive remark that even a 
dog distinguishes between an intentional 
beating and an accidental injury. In 
any event, we know that "understand- 
ing" and "volition" have important bear- 
ings on culpability in our criminal law 
largely because of insistence that punish- 
ment be inflicted only on immoral per- 
sons. But in other fields of law, notably 
torts, absolute liability, i.e., liability de- 
spite due care, has been widely imple- 
mented in recent years. Perhaps similar 
reasons can be invoked in defense of 
mala prohibita if the absence of any 
mens rea is assumed. The major theo- 
retical difficulties seem rather to relate 
to penalization for negligent conduct, 
and to interpretations that would elimi- 
nate responsibility entirely as irrelevant 
to penal treatment. 
The history of lack of mental capacity 
as a defense parallels much of the law on 
culpability of normal persons. It is still 
common for writers intent solely on re- 
form to assert that an eighteenth-century 
judge held that a person had to be "as 
mad as a wild beast" before he could 
be exculpated on grounds of mental dis- 
ease. There usually follow desultory 
remarks on the progress in psychology, 
culminating in fulsome praise of the 
achievements of that discipline in the 
twentieth century. The facts are rather 
more complicated, even after contempo- 
rary psychology is critically evaluated. 
The eighteenth-century judge did not 
say what is reported of him. He said 
the diseased person does "not know what 
he is doing, no more than a wild beast"; 
and his opinion, read in its entirety, is 
much too sensible to be distorted into 
the above exaggeration.' As a matter 
of fact, if we go back as far as the thir- 
teenth century and read Bracton fairly, 
we may come away with no little admi- 
ration for the understanding and mod- 
eration of those days regarding responsi- 
bility of mentally diseased persons. The 
history of ethics and epistemology is 
ancient and pregnant with ideas current 
today. 
So, too, ideas on culpability seem to 
have persisted over longer periods of 
7R v. Arnold (1724) 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 
764. 
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time and to have been modified only 
slightly in comparison with overt be- 
havior designated "criminal." But if 
the elements that constitute culpability 
in our law seem to be few and relatively 
static, we must remember that these con- 
ceptions lie in the most difficult part of 
criminal law and criminology. Until we 
have had sustained analyses of the rela- 
tion of these ideas to intellectual, social, 
and legal problems in various countries 
and times, we must cling to a whole- 
some skepticism of any existing inter- 
pretations. 
ADEQUACY OF LEGAL CONCEPTS 
As regards both the overt phases of 
criminal behavior and those aspects of 
it that refer to responsibility, one major 
problem concerns the adequacy of legal 
concepts. It must be recognized that 
there is a constant, practically inevitable 
lag between the legal categories and ac- 
tual behavior patterns; this lag increases 
in proportion to the acceleration of social 
change. Indeed, there is little factual 
content in any legal definition of crime 
that is entirely invariant over a long 
period of years. Not only do the words 
change in meaning more or less without 
such change being noticed, but also, the 
professionals distort, expand, and con- 
tract them as they deem necessary. Hu- 
man beings are thus occasionally brought 
within the punitive apparatus against 
reasonable expectation, or perhaps, more 
fortunately, they escape despite coinci- 
dence of legal norm and behavior. 
It is impossible here to develop the 
technical aspects of the above problem. 
They have received considerable atten- 
tion in current jurisprudence, especially 
where the function of the judicial process 
has been emphasized or where wide re- 
forms have been sought. Irrationalism 
and "verbal camouflage" are blanket and 
all-too-easy dispositions of legal con- 
cepts. The actual existence and func- 
tions of these entities are evidenced by 
conduct, by repeated common occur- 
rences, by uniform patterns of behavior 
in societies where laws are unwritten, 
as well as in our own. If this is estab- 
lished, investigation moves into fair per- 
spective and permits the most searching 
inquiries as to correspondence of norm 
with actuality; no less does it provide 
for the most detailed, uncompromising 
criticism of the adequacy of existing 
legal concepts to implement attainment 
of desirable objectives. 
This actual inadequacy and the limi- 
tations accordingly imposed on adminis- 
tration even by the best possible per- 
sonnel produce areas of uncertainty, a 
shadowland where crime merges imper- 
ceptibly into lawful conduct. It is in- 
defensible to hold individuals responsible 
or malevolent for the consequences of 
these conditions. Explanation must, of 
course, include all sorts of motivation; 
frequently forgotten are the institutions, 
the given concepts, ends, economic con- 
ditions, and the concrete fact-situations 
that raise specific problems in the total 
culture complex. Thus when we find 
that prior to the rise of criminal fraud, 
certain behavior (e.g., the ring-dropping 
confidence game) was held larceny by 
trick, and that afterwards identical be- 
havior was held fraud, i.e., obtaining 
property by false pretenses, we must not 
indulge in particularisms that ignore the 
total situation. Rather we must probe 
the relevant social realities for more 
adequate explanations. This not only 
does not check, it facilitates understand- 
ing of existing terminology and legal 
conceptions. There is no a priori rea- 
son, therefore, to continue to accept 
such formulations as mens rea, mala in 
se, mala prohibita, malice aforethought, 
premeditation, larceny by trick, and 
many others, as including adequate de- 
scriptions of significant realities. Too 
many innocent persons get hoisted on 
the petard of such archaism; yet we 
have only just begun to make the de- 
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tailed empirical researches that are nec- 
essary to sustain intelligent reform of 
existing legal concepts. 
THEORIES OF CRIME 
In all discussions of crime, as in the 
above, certain facts are described; it 
is obvious that their selection is influ- 
enced by value-judgments and by other 
interpretations as to significance. If 
we consider the discourses of scholars, 
we find an elaborate array of explana- 
tion that complicates analysis consid- 
erably. We can simply take note of the 
variety of these theories on the nature 
of crime. They have run, broadly, in 
physical, biological, and social terms; 
some have been devoted entirely to indi- 
vidual differences, others to cultural 
processes. There are theories based on 
"interests" with stress on security or 
group survival or the power of eco- 
nomically dominant classes; taboo, dis- 
cipline, sympathetic identification with 
victims of attack, ethical principles, and 
penal laws have provided the founda- 
tions of other theories. If we view theo- 
rizing on crime chronologically, and for 
convenience indulge in certain arbitrary 
divisions, we can distinguish theological 
(St. Paul, Bernard), ethical (Kant), 
classical (Beccaria), utilitarian (Ben- 
tham), formalist (Austin), positivist 
(Lombroso, Garofalo, Ferri), various 
neo-modifications of the above, and 
pragmatist (Saldafia) versions. 
It is apparent that these theories par- 
allel the entire history of western 
thought. They may be regarded as a 
type of opinion in so far as they, too, 
reflect phases of the total culture com- 
plex within which crime is integrated. 
(Such employment of theories is, of 
course, not to be confused with inquiries 
as to their validity.) Adding theory to 
"conditions," we can achieve greater in- 
sight into the basic realities within 
which crimes as social phenomena are 
integrated. 
CRIME AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 
Criminologists study those phases of 
social reality which irritate, produce ten- 
sion, run counter to accepted values, con- 
stitute social problems. Specifically, 
their concern is those social problems 
that center on violation of actual penal 
laws.s Understanding these social prob- 
lems depends on knowledge of social 
realities, which not only defy actual divi- 
sion, but which can be comprehended 
only as integers. Hence criminology 
and the other social disciplines do not 
represent distinctive types of theory, nor 
are they concerned with essentially dif- 
ferent subject-matters. They can be 
differentiated only in terms of the types 
of questions asked concerning social 
phenomena. Convenience and lack of 
time require division of labor, but these 
are only human limitations, not imposed 
by the nature of the data we seek to 
understand. Ideally, each social disci- 
pline would, therefore, represent the 
incidence of all social science upon dis- 
tinctive questions posed by thoughtful 
persons. These questions are suggested 
not arbitrarily, but by the nature of so- 
cial problems that have reference to 
common social realities. 
CRIMINOLOGY AS INTEGRATION 
To illustrate the above and to imple- 
ment the writer's thesis that all social 
scientists are concerned with common 
social realities, about which they legiti- 
mately ask different questions, consider 
crime as "a violation of a penal law." 
Only logicians and lawyers may be con- 
tent with the legal definition of "crime." 
It suits their purposes. Criminologists 
consider the fact that while some laws 
(and pro tanto, crimes) may be arbi- 
trary or archaic, on the whole (barring 
despotism) they have an intimate rela- 
8 This has received detailed analysis in the 
writer's "Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal 
Law" (1941) 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 549. 
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tionship to moral attitudes, to ethics, to 
the affective nature of man, to culture, 
and to custom. If the approach is by 
way of "violation of group values against 
which the group reacts punitively," we 
are confronted by the whole sweep of 
social life, which we can penetrate only 
with partial insight. Or suppose our 
starting point is "social disorganization" 
or "social pathology." Can we under- 
stand these without knowing "social or- 
ganization," which, in other terms, also 
involves the whole of social reality? 
We can implement the argument spe- 
cifically in terms that refer to other so- 
cial disciplines: consider one of the com- 
monest of crimes-the theft of auto- 
mobiles and the related receiving stolen 
goods. Where can one stop in under- 
standing this behavior? Private enter- 
prise and the market place; technology 
and invention; environment, especially 
of urban centers; moral attitudes toward 
private property; ethical principles; law 
enforcement; juvenile delinquency; the 
personalities involved; biological infe- 
riority; and many others-is there any 
actual boundary which can be imposed 
on the social phenomena relevant to this 
single type of criminal behavior? 
In terms of existing disciplines, one 
can readily perceive many relations to 
economics, sociology, ethics, social psy- 
chology, biology, and others. These 
disciplines can be reconstructed much 
more rapidly than the social realities 
they explore. Increase in knowledge in 
criminology, as in each of the social sci- 
ences, consists in this very exploration 
of the interrelationships of phenomena 
relevant to questions asked about certain 
social problems, i.e., in the construction 
of a total significant social configuration. 
The collaboration that has existed for 
many years between legal scholars and 
criminologists has produced a body of 
social science and a knowledge of meth- 
ods of research that have significance for 
integration of the social disciplines gen- 
erally. 
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